In this case out of Dauphin County the Commonwealth Court held that municipalities cannot prohibit through zoning regulations the placement of violent offenders into work-release programs within their jurisdiction.
This blog features case law related to real estate, land use, zoning, and municipal law in Pennsylvania
Category: Land Use and Zoning (Page 8 of 9)
In this case out of Susquehanna County, the Commonwealth Court determined that where a subdivision and land development ordinance (SALDO) does not impose a mandate upon a municipality to enforce it, the municipality cannot be compelled to enforce the SALDO by a writ of mandamus. The court also determined that where a lease does not convey a discrete portion of land to a lessee, it does not constitute subdivision that triggers approval under the SALDO.
In this exclusionary zoning case out of Beaver County, the Commonwealth Court determined that requiring group living facilities to have 24-hour onsite supervision was de jure exclusionary of “partial” Community Residential Rehabilitation Services (CRRS) and therefore unconstitutional.
In this case out of Berks County the Commonwealth Court weighed in on whether erecting a fence around a high school’s athletic fields constituted a new “stadium use” or was an expansion of a preexisting nonconforming use. In concluding that the fence did not create a new stadium use or expand the preexisting nonconforming use the court reversed the ZHB’s decision and ordered the requested permits be issued.
On November 26, 2008 Gaughen submitted a land development plan to the Borough Manager of Mechanicsburg seeking approval for a 5-unit apartment complex under the Borough’s Subdivision and Land Development Ordinance (SALDO). On December 10, the Borough Engineer issued a memo stating that the plan did not comply with certain provisions of the Zoning Ordinance, SALDO, and Stormwater Ordinance. Thereafter Gaughen never submitted a revised plan to the Borough and the Borough never notified Gaughen that his application was incomplete or not filed. The 90-day period in which the Borough had to act on Gaughen’s plans, pursuant to the Municipalities Planning Code (MPC), expired on February 24, 2009. On February 25th the Borough received an extension from Gaughen’s engineer. On June 2nd the Borough officially denied Gaughen’s plan. Six months later Gaughen instituted a mandamus action seeking a deemed approval based on the Borough’s failure to act on the plan or receive an extension by February 24th.
In a zoning case out of Philadelphia, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court cleared up some lingering confusion over the differing “aggrieved person” standards applied in Municipalities Planning Code (MPC) versus Home Rule jurisdictions. The court determined that while challenges to standing had to be raised before the zoning appeals board in MPC jurisdictions, in Home Rule jurisdictions they could be raised before the trial court.
In this federal magistrate decision, the court found that permitting parks, playgrounds, and educational institutions, but not religious assemblies, in a zoning district constituted a violation of the Equal Terms provision of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”).
Palencar was issued an enforcement notice that certain structures on his property required zoning permits. He submitted an application/appeal form indicating a variance was requested, but not that Palencar wished to appeal the enforcement notice. Prior to the hearing Palencar’s attorney phoned the ZHB Solicitor and indicated Palencar also wanted to appeal the enforcement notice. The ZHB published notice of the hearing stating it would consider an appeal “from the zoning officer’s determination.” A hearing was held and the ZHB found Palencar had violated the ordinance and upheld the enforcement notice. Palencar appealed.
The Commonwealth Court was recently asked to weigh in on what exactly constitutes sufficient “participation” in a zoning hearing to grant a party standing to appeal. In overturning the lower court’s decision, the Commonwealth Court effectively said “not much.”
Pennswood owned an old school building that had previously been redeveloped into a personal care home. The building was located in an R2 zone-medium density residential district. In 1986 Pennswood had obtained a variance to operate the personal care home, but due to economic factors such a use was no longer feasible. Therefore, Pennswood applied to the ZHB for a variance to permit it to operate a Treatment Center/Step Down Unit in the property. It argued the property’s prior prohibited use under the zoning ordinance constituted an unnecessary hardship that warranted a variance. The property, it argues, would be rendered almost valueless if the variance were not granted because the physical characteristics of the property limited its use to either a personal care home or a residential step down unit. Further, it presented testimony that it would not be feasible to renovate the Property for residential use as an upscale project because of the cost, the lack of parking, and the fact that that area was more commercial than residential.
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