The Commonwealth Court was asked to weigh in on whether a purchaser of real estate at an upset sale for unpaid taxes was responsible for paying taxes that accrue between the date of purchase at upset sale and the date the deed was conveyed. In affirming the lower court’s determination, the court held that the purchaser was responsible for such taxes.
Pennsylvania Real Estate, Land Use, Zoning, and Municipal Lawyers
This blog features case law related to real estate, land use, zoning, and municipal law in Pennsylvania
Page 12 of 21
If chickens are raised on the farm, is a plant for processing those chickens considered part of that agricultural use? That was the question presented to the Commonwealth Court in this case. After analyzing the specific language of the municipal zoning ordinance, the court concluded such a facility was part of an agricultural use and therefore was permitted in a district that only allowed agriculture uses.
In this follow up case to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013) in which the Court struck down several provisions of Act 13, the State’s oil and gas law, that provided uniform statewide regulation of land uses associated with oil and gas operations, the Court dealt another blow to Act 13 by finding additional provisions either unconstitutional or not severable. The Court struck down additional sections related to allowing gas companies to employ eminent domain, exempting private water sources from being notified following spills, preventing doctors from disclosing or using information about patients’ chemical exposures, and allowing requests for state review of local ordinances.
In this case, the Commonwealth Court was asked to apply the Right-to-Know Law (“RTKL”) and determine whether financial information contained in contracts between state agencies and outside vendors is excluded from disclosure through RTKL requests. In reversing the Office of Open Records (“OOR”) final determination, the Court concluded that such information was specifically excluded under § 708(b)(26) and could be redacted by the responding state agency.
This case out of Erie County involved a substantive validity challenge of an ordinance down-zoning a property based on an allegation of illegal spot zoning. In affirming the dismissal of the challenge, the Commonwealth Court concluded that Objectors had failed to satisfy their burden of establishing that the parcel was characteristically similar to surrounding properties.
In this case the Commonwealth Court was asked to determine whether “short-term rentals” of residential dwelling units were encompassed within the definition of a “single-family dwelling,” or constituted a separate commercial use. In reversing the trial court’s decision, the Commonwealth Court concluded that such rentals must be permitted, unless expressly prohibited by, or encompassed within another defined use in, the applicable zoning ordinance.
In this dispute between a condominium association council and three condominium owners, the Superior Court was asked to determine whether a provision of the Uniform Condominium Act (UCA) requiring a two-thirds majority vote of owners to amend a Declaration of Condominium, applied retroactively to a Declaration enacted under its precursor, the Unit Property Act (UPA). The Superior Court concluded that because the Declaration was silent about the percentage required for Declaration amendments, no conflict existed between it and the UCA, and thus the UCA provision governed Declaration amendments, requiring a two-thirds vote..
In this decision, the Commonwealth Court determined that a home purchaser, not in direct privity with the original home builder, may assert claims for fraud and claims under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCPL”).
In this case out of Adams County, the Commonwealth Court was presented with a question regarding whether a zoning hearing board (“ZHB”) can deny an application for zoning relief based on a provision that was not raised, or incorrectly cited, by the zoning officer in his initial denial. In finding that the ZHB could make such a finding, the court supported its determination by citing to the fact that the issue had been raised at the zoning hearing and the applicant had been given an opportunity to address the issue and supplement the record prior to its close.
This case deals with the question of whether the common law merger of lots doctrine is applicable when a local governing body has not adopted a merger of lots provision in its zoning ordinance. The Commonwealth Court found that this doctrine has no application absent a merger of lots provision in the local zoning ordinance because it is a creature of local ordinance, not common law.
Published By:
