In this takings case out of Bucks County, the Commonwealth Court was asked to determine whether the inadvertent redirection of storm water onto a property constituted a de facto taking that would require the municipality to pay just compensation. In concluding the resultant flooding did not rise to the level of a de facto taking, the Court concluded that although the municipality had intentionally redirected runoff, the choice of discharge locations had not been intentional and did not warrant an award of just compensation.
This blog features case law related to real estate, land use, zoning, and municipal law in Pennsylvania
Tag: Commonwealth Court (Page 6 of 14)
In this zoning appeal out of Alleghany County, the Commonwealth Court was asked whether preservation requirements imposed by a government agency on property that it owned, may constitute an unnecessary hardship to justify a variance. In concluding such a hardship is self-imposed and does not warrant a variance, the court focused on the fact that no legal authority required preservation, and that the more appropriate solution was for the City to rezone the site rather than have the applicant seek a variance.
In this appeal from a preliminary opinion of Lower Merion Township, the Commonwealth Court was asked to determine what constituted a “street” when a zoning ordinance requires a specific “lot width at street line.” In finding that a right-of-way allowing access to a land-locked property constituted a “street” for purposes of determining lot width at street line, the court held that the two requirements for a “street” were that the right-of-way provide: (1) a means for vehicular travel, and (2) space for sewers and public utilities.
In this challenge of the grant of a variance by the City of Philadelphia’s Zoning Board of Adjustment (“ZBA”), the Commonwealth Court ruled that a narrow side-yard and district-wide parking restrictions did not amount to an unnecessary hardship that would warrant a variance to locate a parking space within the front-yard setback.
In this appeal of a final determination of the Office of Open Records (“OOR”), the Commonwealth Court remanded a determination granting access to the home addresses of certain members of the State Employees’ Retirement System (“SERS”). The Court held that its decision in Pennsylvania State Education Association v. Office of Open Records, 148 A.3d 142 (Pa. 2016) (“PSEA III”) was controlling, and, as PSEA III had been issued after OOR had rendered its final determination, the matter should be remanded to allow OOR to reevaluate whether dissemination was warranted.
In this case out of Luzerne County, the Commonwealth Court was presented with a claim that a municipality had violated a landlord’s constitutional rights by performing an inspection of his property without an administrative warrant, and without his consent. In finding no violation had occurred, the Court concluded that the tenant’s consent to perform the inspection satisfied the constitutional requirements and no violation had occurred.
In this breach of contract action out of Montgomery County, the Commonwealth Court was asked to determine whether a municipality could be held vicariously liable for the actions of members of a Township Board of Supervisors. In reversing the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County’s decision, the Commonwealth Court held that, similar to a private corporation, a political subdivision can only carry out its duties through its agents, servants, and employees; including members of its governing body. As agents of the municipality, the municipality could be held vicariously liable for their actions.
In this mandamus action out of Washington County, a billboard company (“All State”) sought to compel a Borough to issue billboard permits after Borough Council failed to act on the applications for nearly 6 months. The Court of Common Pleas of Washington County granted summary judgment, based in part on the fact that the proposed billboards would only have been permitted if the zoning ordinance were found to be exclusionary. The Commonwealth Court reversed, stating the underlying merits of the applications was irrelevant where a deemed approval was asserted, and remanding the matter to determine whether the applications had been deemed approved.
In this appeal of a zoning violation notice, the Commonwealth Court was asked to determine whether short-term rentals of entire properties, made common by services such as AirBnB, are encompassed by existing definitions for more traditional uses, such as tourist homes, hotels, or motels. In strictly applying the terms of the applicable ordinance, the Court concluded that “shoe-horning” such uses into existing definitions was improper, and the regulation of such uses must be done by amending the applicable zoning ordinance.
In this appeal out of Lehigh County, the Commonwealth Court was presented with a challenge to the City of Allentown’s residential rental unit licensing ordinance. Objecting landlords (“Challengers”) asserted the fee constituted an unlawful special tax and sought an injunction against its enforcement. In affirming the trial court’s finding in favor of the City, the Commonwealth Court held that certain indirect costs were to be considered when evaluating the reasonableness of a municipal fee, and Challengers’ failure to include any indirect costs meant they had not met their burden and the case was properly dismissed.
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